ABSTRACT. In this paper, we define some consequence relations based on supervaluation semantics for partial models, and we investigate their properties. For our main consequence relation, we show that natural versions of the following fail: upwards and downwards Lowenheim-Skolem, axiomatizability, and compactness. We also consider an alternate version for supervaluation semantics, and show both axiomatizability and compactness for the resulting consequence relation.
PARTIAL MODELS AND SUPERVALUATION SEMANTICS
In this paper, we define some consequence relations based on supervaluation semantics for partial models, and we investigate their properties.
Given a first order language L, let a partial model for L be an ordered pair M = D, I , where D, the domain of discourse, is a non-empty set, and I is a function assigning -to each name of L a member of D; -to each n-place function symbol of L an n-place function on D; -to some, all or none of the propositional variables of L a member of {t, f} so that I restricted to the propositional variables is a partial function; and -to each n-place relation symbol R of L an ordered pair I (R) = I + (R) Formal supervaluation semantics are first introduced by van Fraassen (1966) , but in a context different from that of our partial models. Van Fraassen is interested in languages with truth value gaps generated by nondenoting names, rather than by partial predicates: thus his notion of a partial model is quite different to ours. Supervaluation semantics for languages with nondenoting names are studied in-depth by Woodruff (1984) . The supervaluation idea occurs as early as Mehlberg's (1958) treatment of vagueness, though Mehlberg's presentation is informal. Fine (1975) presents formal supervaluation semantics for vagueness. See also Lewis (1970) and Dummett (1970) . Supervaluations for partial models in which "true" is a partial predicate were implicit in van Fraassen's (1968) discussion of the truth-theoretic paradoxes, but this was first fully developed by Kripke (1975) . See McGee (1991) for a supervaluation treatment, using partial models, of "true" as a vague predicate.
We define three superconsequence relations (adopting terminology from Woodruff (1984) ). Here we assume that and are sets of sentences.
The idea of adding backwards falsehood preservation to the more standard truth preservation, and the idea of allowing both multiple antecedents and multiple consequents à la Gentzen, are due to Scott (1975) , though he was working with the strong Kleene scheme (see below) for evaluating sentences in partial models, rather than with the supervaluation scheme. Motivations for adopting these ideas are discussed in M. Kremer (1986) (68-75) and (1988) (see Section 5, below). Note:
(1) t B iff classically entails B, (2) A f iff A classically entails (in the sense that every classical model that makes A true makes some member of true), and (3) A B iff A classically entails B.
Our main results concerning , t and f are that their finitary fragments are not axiomatizable, and that the relations themselves are not compact (see Section 3, below). Thus, although supervaluation semantics have been touted as preserving classical logic -mostly on account of (1), above -any such claim must be muted by our results.
Implicit in Mehlberg and explicit in Fine and others is an idea not yet mentioned: that the truth value of A in a partial model M is determined not by its truth value in all classical precisifications, but by its truth value in all admissible classical priecisifications. Scarlet and red are probably both vague predicates, and the partial model M representing the use of these predicates will contain some item in neither the extension nor the antiextension of either predicate. Yet we might insist that in every admissible classical precisification -every classical precisification relevant to the truth values of the sentences of the language -if an item is in the extension of scarlet then it must also be in the extension of red. This would ensure, for example, that ∀x(x is scarlet ⊃ x is red) is true. In Section 4, below, we consider superconsequence relations based on this additional idea.
The main rivals to supervaluations are the valuations determined by the weak and strong Kleene schemes. The Kleene schemes agree with the supervaluation scheme for atomic sentences, for example, they agree that the atomic sentence Rc is t if I (c) ∈ I + (R) and
we add a third "truth value" n for "neither true nor false", then the weak and strong Kleene schemes can be characterized as follows, with ∀ and ∃ treated analogously to & and ∨. For both Kleene schemes, ¬t = f and ¬f = t and ¬n = n. For both Kleene schemes, if x, y ∈ {t, f} then (x & y) and (x ∨ y) are as in the classical scheme, e.g.,
For the weak Kleene scheme, if either x = n or y = n then (x ∨ y) = (x & y) = n. Thus, on both Kleene schemes, if A is n, then so is (A ∨ ¬A). Proof. For the downwards part, consider a countable language with identity, and with one relational predicate L and one unary predicate F . Let M be the following partial model:
Let be the set of sentences true in M, and let
Finally, note that for any sentence A in the F -free fragment of the language,
Now suppose that M = D , I is a countable model which makes all of true. Note first that for any sentence A in the F -free fragment of the language, we wil| have that
is isomorphic to that of the rational numbers under ≤, and there is some non-empty X ⊆ D which has an upper bound under I (L) but has no least upper bound under
In the first case, V M (∃x¬F x) = t, and in the second case V M (∃xF x) = t, so M is not a counterexample to the consequence t .
For the upwards part, consider a countable language with identity, and with one relational predicate S and one unary predicate F . Let M be the following partial model:
Let be the set of sentences true in M, and let Here, partial models M and M are elementarily equivalent iff for every 
f , and (7) . Proof. We will simultaneously show (1) and (2). (3) follows from (1) since f B iff ¬B t {¬A : A ∈ }. Similarly, (4) follows from (2). (5) follows from (3), (6) from (1), and (7) from (2). Let an R-sentence be any sentence A in which the identity sign does not occur, and such that R is the only relation symbol, name or function symbol occurring in A. For (1) and (2), it will suffice to show that if either f B is axiomatizable or B is axiomatizable, then there is a positive test for the classical consistency of R-sentences B.
So assume that either f B is axiomatizable or B is axiomatizable. Shortly we will define a sentence C, and we will define, for every R-sentence B, a finite set B such that 
S). Note that M ≤ M , since I (R) = ∅, ∅ and I + (S) ⊆ I + (S) and I − (S) ⊆ I − (S). But this contradicts the fact that V M (B) = t and V M (B) = f. ✷
Remark. With some coding, the Nonaxiomatizability Theorem can be strengthened to languages with only one two-place relation symbol, no other relation symbol, no identity sign, no names and no function symbols. (1) and (2) imply that t is not compact. (3) and (4) imply not only that is not compact, but that is not even "compact on the right" in the obvious sense, even when there is only one sentence on the left. A dual argument shows that f is not compact and that is not "compact on the left", even when there is only one sentence on the right. Note that A classically implies . So A f . Thus, for (4) it suffices to show (2). Also, (3) follows from (1). So it suffices to show (1) and (2).
SUPERCONSEQUENCE NONCOMPACTNESS
First we prove (1). It suffices to show that A t n where n = {∃x∃yRxy, ∃x∃y¬Rxy, B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n }, for each n ≥ 1. For this, let M = D, I where D = {1, 2, 3, . . . , n+1} and where
. . , n, V M (B i ) = t. To see this, let M = D, I , where
I + (R) = { i, i + 1 : i = 1, 2, .
. . , n}; and I
This is because D is finite, so that in every precisification of M, A is true.
(1) follows from (1.1), (1.2), and (1.3). 
Next we prove (2). So suppose that
Now since D is finite, suppose that the cardinality of D is n. It follows that V M (B n ) = t. This contradicts the assumption that for every B ∈ , V M (B) = t. This completes the proof of (2). ✷
Remark. The present proof uses an example due to an anonymous referee and replaces a more complex example and proof in the original version of the paper.
TRUTH IN ALL ADMISSIBLE PRECISIFICATIONS
As pointed out in Section 1, above, given a partial model M, we might want to evaluate sentences not by looking at all precisifications, but rather by looking only at the admissible precisifications. The idea is that the admissible precisifications are the precisifications that satisfy certain constraints. One way to implement this idea is to define a supermodel to be a partial model M together with some set of classical precisifications of M. Truth in a supermodel would then be truth in all the specified precisifications. But notice that the partial model M drops out of the picture: any two supermodels, thus defined, with the same set of classical precisifications will make the same sentences true and the same sentences false, regardless of whether the underlying partial models are distinct.
So we define a supermodel to be a nonempty set M of classical models 
If A has no free individual variables, we again just write
We define three new superconsequence relations. Here we assume that and are sets of formulas. Prior to proving this theorem, we introduce some terminology and a lemma. First the terminology. Let P = {p 1 , . . . , p n } be a set of distinct propositional variables. A P -sentence is a sentence in the propositional fragment of the language all of whose propositional variables are in P . If x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ {t, f}, then we will use the notation x 1 . . . We say that a model M = x 1 . . . x n is a P -model. We say that a supermodel M is a P -supermodel iff every M ∈ M is a P -model. Let M 0 = D, I be the following partial model: D = {0}; I (b) = 0 for every name b; I (f )(0, . . . , 0) = 0 for every n-ary function symbol f ; I + (R) = D n and I − (R) = ∅ for every nonlogical n-ary relation symbol R; I (p i ) = n for i = 1, . . . , n; and I (p) = t for p / ∈ P . Then the classical precisifications of M 0 are the P -models. We now have the following lemma.
LEMMA. For any finite set P = {p 1 , . . . , p n } of propositional variables, and any P -supermodel M there are P -sentences A 1 , . . . , A n such that for every
The α i so defined are essentially n-ary truth-functions, so that by the expressive completeness of the propositional calculus, there are P -sentences
A trivial induction on the complexity of S shows that for every P -sentence S and Remark. The present proof of the substitution theorem is adapted from an argument of Thomason (1973) . It replaces a much more cumbersome proof in an earlier version of this paper. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out to us the similarity of our substitution theorem to Thomason's results.
The connection of our topic to modal logic bears spelling out: in the propositional context, a supermodel is effectively an S5 possible worlds model, and our definition of truth in a supermodel for a sentence A corresponds to the usual definition of truth in S5 for ✷A. Therefore, in the propositional context, * t iff ✷ S5 ✷ , where ✷ = {✷A : A ∈ }. Similarly, our definition of falsehood in a supermodel for a sentence A corresponds to the usual definition of truth in S5 for ✷¬A, and so (1) and (2), and the proof of (2) (1) delivers an axiomatization of * t and (2) of * f for languages without the identity sign. For * t , just take any axiomatization of classical consequence with multiple antecedents and a single or empty consequent, and add the rule of weakening, usable on the right only as the last step in a derivation. Dually, for * f , just take any axiomatization of classical consequence with a single or empty antecedent and multiple consequents, and add the rule of weakening, usable on the left only as the last step in a derivation. These give an axiomatization of * for languages without the identity sign. Take the axiomatization of . Add constants k 0 , k 1 , . . . , k n , . . . to the language. List the existentially quantified formulas of the expanded language as ∃x 0 A 0 , ∃x 1 A 1 , . . . , ∃x n A n , . . . in such a way that k n does not occur in ∃x m A m when m ≤ n. (For simplicity, we are making an inessential assumption that the original language is countable.) Well-order the formu- Woodruff (1984) investigates a supervaluation semantics and a superconsequence relation, but for languages with nondenoting singular terms rather than nonclassical predicates. In his semantics, the upwards and downwards Lowenheim-Skolem theorems fail, as does the analogue of the sehtenceset compactness of Section 2. Woodruff defines a superconsequence relation s based on the preservation of truth-in-a-partial-model, allowing multiple antecedents but only one consequent. Our analogue to s is t restricted to one consequent. Our analogue to s is equivalent to classical consequence, while Woodruff's s is 1 1 -complete. His techniques do not seem helpful in establishing the exact complexity, beyond the nonaxiomatizability, of our . We leave this as another open question.
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